The US aviation authorities have launched a review of high-priority safety checks
Over the years – and what information he gave airlines – about potential risks associated with a new flight control system introduced in the latest versions of a 737.
The Federal Aviation Administration, after about two weeks of declining descent to respond to every aspect of a plane crash in Lyon last month in Indonesia, which killed all 189 people aboard and participated in the 737 Max 8, issued a statement stating that the safety data and conclusions from the Chicago- Provided the agency as part of the 737 Max approval and 8 MAX models.
The statement also stated that agency officials are reviewing the training requirements for pilots.
The review is part of Lion Air Crash's overall investigation.
The statement said that future regulatory action, and generally increased supervision of Boeing's risk assessment processes, is approaching. "The FAA and Boeing continue to assess the need for software and / or other design changes," including the "as we learn from "A continuous crash test led by authorities in Indonesia.
The statement is the clearest sign of internal FAA concerns resulting from initial clues about why a twin-engine engine plunged into the sea at a steep high-speed angle.
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A spokesman for Boeing said: "While we can not discuss the privacy of an ongoing investigation, we have provided two updates to our operators around the world, which reaffirm the existing procedures for these situations."
When Boeing chose to install the new flight control feature, according to government officials, the company concluded that it is almost impossible for the combination of sensor failure, pilot operations and automated commands down by the new system to cause serious safety hazard.
But now, with initial crash data indicating that the aircraft is only experienced in such a sequence of events before a crash, the company's risk analyzes and decision-making are under increased public scrutiny. So is the FAA supervision, which has agreed to allow three US airlines to start flying the new models without Boeing providing flight crews or airline officials with details about how the new flight control system works and the risks it could pose in exceptional circumstances by automatically and automatically pushing In spite of the plane.
The researchers did not determine the cause of the crash, and safety experts warned it was too early to say how much the new flight control system's role in the tragedy was. But as more clues emerge and crash researchers dig deeper into programming and interplay between different computer systems and cockpit views, the focus is more on the assumptions of the first Boeing estimates.
More than 200 737 Max aircraft have been transferred to airlines around the world, including US carriers
American Airlines and United Airlines. This represents a fraction of the thousands of 737s used.
Indonesian researchers are still looking for the tape of the aircraft's cockpit, which can contain vital information about what the pilots saw and did while dealing with suspicion of a suspicious eruption of conflicting electronic alerts, unreliable air velocity sightings and seemingly uncontrollable aircraft as it falls into the water. Researchers and safety experts said that after a certain point, the team could only seconds to react properly.
A memorandum dated November 10 from the Southwest Administration of the pilots, reviewed by the Wall Street Journal, noted that Boeing had dropped information from the flight instructors on the new flight control system because pilots would not find themselves in situations where characteristics. The flight control system, among other things, is designed to prevent pilots from tilting the plane.
Disadvantages Boeing's risk analysis procedures in the past have raised significant regulatory, financial, and public relations headaches in the company. Initially it did not recognize or contradict rechargeable lithium batteries, which are installed on Boeing's flagship Boeing 787. All aircraft were temporarily grounded until Boeing and the FAA agreed on a foolproof repair.
Pilots' unions complained publicly that before the Leon Air plane had landed, they had received no significant information or training about the new flight control system.
In the past, Boeing had other cases where it was not entirely transparent with pilots. When the company changed some software years ago, to prevent a team of about 767 models accidentally throw airplane tails on the runway during take-off, he did not inform the pilots about the change, according to one person familiar with the details.
Apart from the details of safety reviews related to Air Lion crash, the accident could have broader implications for the way FAA approved new aircraft models and increasingly complex computer systems control over the equipment on board.
The agency has for some time shifted more responsibility to aircraft manufacturers and equipment to carry out detailed risk assessments on new or derivative products. Congress has been pushing FAA leaders in the same direction, partly to save federal dollars partially to streamline and streamline regulatory requirements for the industry.
But the Leon Air crash should trigger an argument over whether the FAA gave Boeing an excessive advantage – and then independently approved the company's conclusions – about possible consequences and unexpected risks with the new flight control system.
In a statement Tuesday, the FAA said it was now testing each of Boeing's private safety tests and then switched to the FAA, covering every computerized system that receives data from what is called the angle of attack. These sensors, one of which is suspected of malfunctioning on a crashed flight, measure the angle at which the nose of the aircraft wings are raised or lowered. Incorrect angle-of-attack data can result in fast speed displays, false warnings of malfunctions, and other problems that may be interpreted by pilots.